

No. 18-1944

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT**

ALI RAZAK, KENAN SABANI, and KHALDOUN CHERDOUD,
Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and GEGEN LLC,

Defendants - Appellees.

On Appeal from a final Order of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, entered April 11, 2018 in Civil Action No. 16-573

**PETITION OF APPELLEES
FOR PANEL REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC**

Robert W. Pritchard (PA 76979)
Joshua C. Vaughn (PA 203040)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
625 Liberty Avenue, 26th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Telephone: (412) 201-7628
Facsimile: (412) 774-1957
Email: rpritchard@littler.com
Email: jvaughn@littler.com

Paul C. Lantis (PA 309240)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
Three Parkway
1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: (267) 402-3073
Facsimile: (267) 402-3131
Email: plantis@littler.com

Andrew M. Spurchise
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
900 Third Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 583-2684
Facsimile: (212) 832-2719
Email: aspurchise@littler.com

Sophia Behnia
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 276-2561
Email: sbehnia@littler.com

*Attorneys for Appellees Uber
Technologies, Inc. and Gegen LLC*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellees Uber Technologies, Inc. and Gegen LLC petition the Court for a panel rehearing or a rehearing en banc of the Opinion of this Court entered on March 3, 2020, which vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment.

This case presents the question of whether Appellants could carry their burden to prove that they were employees. The district court carefully reviewed the evidence, and determined that the facts were not disputed or that any disputes were not material. The undisputed facts included (among others):

- Ali Razak created Luxe Limousine, invested *in a fleet of more than a dozen* luxury vehicles, entered into leases with individuals to operate that fleet, *engaged more than 50 drivers*, and utilized multiple lead-generation tools (including advertising, Blacklane, and private referrals, in addition to the Uber App) to grow his business.
- Kenan Sabani created Freemo Limo, *created a web page* advertising Freemo, *negotiated deals* on behalf of Freemo with local hotels and private clients, obtained business from private clients (including one client who booked approximately *40 trips each week*), referred business to others, and *engaged other drivers* to provide many of his transportation services.
- Khaldoun Cherdoud's independent business provided transportation services for *private clients* generated through his own initiative, and one year his business made as much money from those private clients as it did from connecting with riders using the Uber App.
- Appellants determined whether, when, where, how, and for how long (if at all) to log onto the Uber App, whether to accept (or not accept) a trip request received on the Uber App, and the extent to which they would utilize (or not utilize) the Uber App as one of many lead generation tools available to them and their businesses.

The district court properly concluded that the totality of the circumstances compelled the legal conclusion that Appellants were independent contractors.

On appeal, the panel sidestepped the legal determination as to Appellants' status. Instead, the panel purported to identify disputes of fact that (in its view) precluded summary judgment. In doing so, the panel misapplied precedent regarding the application of Rule 56 to a motion for summary judgment in a case challenging a worker's status as an independent contractor. When litigating the question of whether a worker is an employee under the Third Circuit's multi-factor test, it will often be the case that some facts (and factors) favor employee status while other facts (and factors) favor independent contractor status; it may also be that issues of fact exist. This Court has explained, however, that: (a) when there are no *genuine* disputes of *material* fact, it is for the court to decide—as a matter of law—whether the worker is an employee or an independent contractor; and (b) a dispute is not material unless resolving it in favor of the nonmoving party *would change the outcome*.

This Court recently recognized that as the economy evolves, courts will “continue to grapple with the challenge of placing novel economic relations on the correct point in the spectrum” between employee and independent contractor. *Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc.*, 937 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2019). The district court rose to the challenge, appropriately performed the “holistic assessment” of all the

facts (considering any disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party), and placed the economic relationship at issue on the correct point in the spectrum. In contrast, the panel evaded the challenge under the guise of purported fact disputes. The purported disputes, however, are neither *genuine* nor *material*.¹

As just one example, the panel cited “Uber decides . . . which driver receives a trip request” as a dispute that precluded summary judgment. Dkt. 89 at 21. This observation did not justify vacating summary judgment, for two reasons. First, there are *no genuine disputes* as to the cited fact; there is no conflicting evidence that the fact-finder would even be able to evaluate on remand. Second, even if the fact were disputed, *it is not material*, since the question of how drivers receive trip requests on the Uber App would not change their placement on the “spectrum” of economic relationships. This is particularly true where, as here, the drivers have complete freedom to choose whether to log onto the Uber App.

The panel compounded its error by announcing and applying the wrong legal standard. Citing *Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc.*, 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), the panel wrote that “if a court finds that there are *any issues of fact* that remain in dispute, it must resolve those disputes prior to granting summary

¹ To be clear, this case is *not* a referendum on the entire “on demand” economy. Appellees’ motion for summary judgment presented the narrow question of whether *Appellants* could prove that *they* were employees. On that question, the evidence left no doubt. As a matter of economic reality, they are in business for themselves and are therefore prototypical independent contractors.

judgment.” Dkt. 89 at 16 (emphasis added). Of course, *DialAmerica* does not support such a standard. Instead, this Court held that summary judgment is appropriate unless there are “disputed issues of *material* fact.” *DialAmerica*, 757 F.2d at 1381 (emphasis added). Where the presentation of “documentary evidence or testimony” at trial would not “aid[] significantly in the adjudication of the case,” *it remains for the court to decide*—as a matter of law—whether the worker is an employee or an independent contractor. *Id.*; *see also Verma*, 937 F.3d at 232. Despite citing to *DialAmerica*, the panel clearly parted from its standard.

The panel’s unsupported view of purported fact disputes and application of the incorrect legal standard contradicts precedent requiring courts to perform a “holistic assessment” of the economic realities of the relationship between the parties—even when the facts and factors point in different directions along the spectrum between employee and independent contractor. Without modification, the panel’s decision will create confusion in future misclassification cases—including those where (as here) it is undisputed that the workers created, owned, and independently operated their own businesses. Appellees therefore request a panel rehearing or a rehearing en banc.

II. STATEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 35.1 OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT LOCAL APPELLATE RULES

I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied professional judgment, that the panel decision is contrary to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit [*Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc.*, 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), and *Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc.*, 937 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2019)] and the Supreme Court of the United States [*Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb*, 333 U.S. 722 (1947)], and that consideration by the full court is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of decisions. In addition, this appeal involves a question of exceptional importance, *i.e.*, the correct summary judgment standard to apply to the FLSA’s economic realities test for workers in various economic relationships.

III. ARGUMENT

This Court uses a multi-factor test to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. *Verma*, 937 F.3d at 229. No factor is dispositive. *Id.* at 230. Rather, a court considers them together in the circumstances of the whole activity to determine whether the worker is dependent on the business to which he renders service or is, as a matter of economic reality, operating an independent business for himself. *Id.*; *see Rutherford Food Corp.*, 333 U.S. at 730.

A. The Panel’s Purported Fact Disputes Are Not Actual Disputes.

In an action challenging the independent contractor status of a worker—as in every other civil action—the district court “shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is not “material” unless its resolution could affect the outcome, and a dispute is not “genuine” unless the evidence is such that a reasonable person could find for the nonmoving party. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Even if there are disputed issues of fact, summary judgment is appropriate when: (a) a reasonable person would not find for the nonmoving party as to the alleged disputed facts; and/or (b) resolving them in favor of the nonmoving party would not change the outcome.

The district court correctly concluded that there were no genuine disputes of material fact. On appeal, Appellants did not challenge *any* of the district court’s factual findings or identify *any* genuine disputes with respect to the material facts that the district court relied upon in determining as a matter of law that Appellants could not meet their burden of showing they were Appellees’ employees. The panel nonetheless determined that genuine disputes of material fact existed in the record—even as to issues where “both parties” agreed “there are no genuine disputes.” Dkt. 89 at 20.

A review of the evidence presented below related to each purported dispute reveals that the material facts were not actually disputed. The most that could be said is that some of the evidence offered by Appellants arguably favored employee

status. In *Verma*, however, this Court made clear that the district court must weigh all of the evidence and (viewing any disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party) reach the appropriate legal determination.

As just one example of the panel mistakenly identifying an undisputed fact as disputed involves the statement that drivers use the Uber App to “connect with riders using the UberBLACK product.” Dkt. 89 at 19. Appellees’ full factual assertion was as follows:

9. Plaintiff Razak signed up to use the Uber App to connect with riders using the UberBLACK product on July 8, 2014 (two years after Luxe was incorporated). ECF 80 (Plaintiffs’ Admitted Facts), at ¶ 10.

SA1123. To support this assertion, Appellees cited Appellants’ own admission filed earlier in the case on Appellees’ partial motion for summary judgment as to compensability of online time:

10. Plaintiff Razak signed up to use the Uber App to connect with riders using the UberBLACK product on July 8, 2014. Holtzman-Conston Decl., ¶9.

Undisputed.

SA0869. The panel ignored Appellants’ prior admission, and instead cited unrelated rhetoric appended to Appellants’ admission in which they argued: “Uber’s statement *implies* that Plaintiff Razak could meet riders through the Uber App, and then independently contract with the riders to perform his own

transportation services. *Not so.*” SA0869 (emphasis added). Of course, advocacy regarding speculative implication is not evidence, and Appellants’ rhetoric does not create a genuine issue as to the asserted fact that drivers used the Uber App to connect with riders. The panel’s citation to Appellants’ “not so” argument as one of the purported disputes sufficient to defeat summary judgment was in error.²

The record below, the district court opinion, and even the panel’s discussion make clear that Appellants expressly admitted as undisputed the vast majority of facts in this case. *See* App. 0476-0550 (ASOF); SA1116-17 (RSOF at 1-2, listing 118 facts admitted by Appellants). Even for averments Appellants purported to dispute, their “dispute” consisted of non-sequiturs that failed to rebut the factual statement³ or else failed to include citations to supporting evidence.⁴ When the

² Even if there had been a genuine dispute on the question of whether Appellants could contract with riders they initially connected with using the Uber App, it would be for the court (not a jury) to determine in the first instance how (if at all) resolving that dispute in favor of Appellants might influence its legal conclusion. This point is underscored by the undisputed evidence that Appellants contracted with riders using other lead generation sources, including internet advertising, Blacklane, and private clients. *See* SA1120 (Sabani provided trips through Freemo and outside of the Uber relationship), SA1161 (Luxe advertised, developed an internet presence, and utilized Blacklane for trip requests).

³ For example, in response to Uber’s statement that it does not control the start and stop times for drivers or require them to work a set number of hours (a fact Appellants admitted), the panel nonetheless considered these facts to be disputed because the number of trip requests that a driver receives is “largely driven by Uber.” Dkt. 89 at 19. This is a non-sequitur. The number of trip requests that a driver receives is unrelated to the fact that Appellants could go online and offline whenever they wanted.

district court referenced a fact that Appellants professed to dispute, the court properly found “such dispute was either not ‘genuine,’ or not ‘material,’ or both.” App. 0013.

On appeal, the panel devoted more than five pages of its opinion to describing facts that it deemed “undisputed except as otherwise noted.” Dkt. 89 at 4 n.1. A careful review of each of the “otherwise noted” disputes shows that no genuine dispute exists. As this Court held just last year, a worker’s status must be determined by the court as a matter of law where there are no genuine disputes of material fact. *Verma*, 937 F.3d at 229-32.

B. The Panel’s Decision Is Contrary To Supreme Court And Third Circuit Precedent.

Well-established precedent requires district courts to apply a holistic assessment of the economic realities of the relationship based on the circumstances of the whole activity. Contrary to this authority, the panel held that *any dispute of fact* (even absent evidence that the dispute is genuine, and even if the fact would

⁴ As the district court observed, “Plaintiffs have not provided record support for many of Plaintiffs’ asserted disputed facts, as required by both Rule 56 and this Court’s practice Order.” ECF 79. *See* SA1117 (RSOF at p.2, explaining how Appellants’ attempt to dispute ownership of Luxe, Freemo and Milano did not comply with Rule 56(c) or reflect a genuine dispute); SA1118-1213 (RSOF, citing more than 80 examples of deficient purported disputes). The panel’s decision suffers the same malady. It also does not cite Appellees’ Revised Reply Statement of Facts, which carefully identified each instance where Appellants failed to support their purported disputes with record evidence. *See* SA1116-1234.

not change the outcome) precludes the district court from making a legal determination about the nature of the economic relationship between the parties. The panels' opinion announced and relied on the wrong legal standard.

In *Rutherford Food Corp.*, the Supreme Court stated, “the determination of the relationship does not depend on such isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.” 333 U.S. at 730. In other words, some facts (and factors) may weigh in different directions, and yet summary judgment may still be appropriate. While acknowledging that “neither the presence nor absence of any particular factor is dispositive” (Dkt. 86 at 13), the panel disregarded this principal and held that *any* disputed fact that might point in favor of the nonmoving party is sufficient to tie the district court's hands and preclude summary judgment.⁵

In *Verma*, this Court applied the following well-established principles when considering a motion for summary judgment on the question of whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor under the FLSA or PMWA:

1. Whether a worker is an employee is a mixed question of fact and law. 937 F.3d at 229.
2. The fact component is the combination of disputed and undisputed facts that comprise the economic relations between the worker and the

⁵ Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently ruled that the black car drivers in that case are independent contractors as a matter of law. *Saleem v. Corporate Transp. Grp., Ltd.*, 854 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2017).

alleged employer. The law component involves whether those facts make a worker an employee or independent contractor as a matter of law. *Id.*

3. Although the court’s judgment must be binary—that is, either employee or independent contractor—the distinction is not a bright line. *Id.* at 232.
4. When there are no genuine disputes of material fact, it is for the court to decide—as a matter of law—whether the worker is an employee. *Id.*
5. This is true even when some facts point to an employee relationship, while other facts point to an independent contractor relationship. *Id.*
6. In such cases, the court must “perform a holistic assessment” and place the relationship on the “correct point in the spectrum.” *Id.*
7. A trial is appropriate *only* where *genuine* disputes of *material* fact concerning the relevant economic relationship *preclude* a trial court from drawing a conclusion as a matter of law on the employee / independent contractor issue. *Id.* at 229.

These principles make sense in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance in *Rutherford* and the Third Circuit’s prior decision in *DialAmerica*. It is the totality of the circumstances as a whole—rather than a single fact or factor—that determines the economic reality of the parties’ relationship. Applying the foregoing principles, the district court properly conducted a holistic assessment of the facts (finding that most facts were undisputed and viewing any disputes in a light most favorable to Appellants), and determined that as a matter of law Appellants are in business for themselves and therefore could not carry their burden of showing they are employees.

Contrary to the foregoing principles from *Rutherford*, *Verma*, and *DialAmerica*, and the district court's well-reasoned decision, the panel suggests that courts should focus on isolated factors, and "if a court finds that there are *any issues of fact* that remain in dispute, it must resolve those disputes prior to granting summary judgment." Dkt. 89 at 16 (emphasis added). This standard, however, would prevent a court from relying on the "circumstances of the whole activity" in applying the *DialAmerica* factors and reaching the legal question. It is therefore an incorrect statement of the law.

The panel's decision misapprehends the concepts of genuineness and materiality in the context of a multi-factor test like the FLSA's economic realities test. It would also elevate immaterial disputes to a level that they overcome the Supreme Court's guidance to consider the "circumstances of the whole activity," and would prevent the court from reaching the legal conclusion regarding the worker's status under the FLSA.⁶ Simply, the panel's approach fails to heed the Court's warning that "we would gain nothing beyond delay by reversing the

⁶ For example, the panel perceived a dispute about whether "drivers can drive for other services while driving for Uber." Dkt. 89 at 19. Sabani admitted, however, that he provided trips through his company when online on the Uber App. SA1120. The panel nonetheless perceived a dispute, because Appellees allegedly prohibited "anonymous pickups" (Dkt. 89 at 19). The panel failed to acknowledge, however, that such prohibition originated with the Philadelphia Parking Authority rather than Appellees. SA1183.

district court's grant of summary judgment and remanding the case for further fact-finding." *DialAmerica*, 757 F.2d at 1382.⁷

The panel's opinion in this case is also contrary to *Verma* on the question of whether the *fact* or *factor* should be sent to the jury.⁸ This Court explained that where a genuine issue of *fact* existed that precluded a court from drawing a conclusion as a matter of law regarding the worker's status (thereby implying there may be situations where a genuine issue of fact may not preclude such a legal conclusion), "the issue" of *fact* "would go to trial, with the jury resolving it through either special interrogatories or by deciding the classification issue." *Verma*, 937 F.3d at 229. "In other cases," such as the case in both *Verma* and here, "the district court may resolve the [factor] issue before trial based on undisputed *facts* in the record." *Id.* (emphasis added).

In other words, although the *DialAmerica* factors rest on subsidiary factual findings, the factors themselves are legal conclusions within the province of the

⁷ Making matters worse, the panel refused to "opine on whether the [allegedly] disputed facts should be resolved by a jury or the District Court through a Rule 52 proceeding." Dkt. 89 at 24. Since Appellants demanded a jury trial (ECF 47), the panel's suggestion that a Rule 52 proceeding might be an option in this case leaves the parties and the district court without clear guidance.

⁸ Rather than arguing that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment, Appellants argue that a reasonable jury could consider the same facts evaluated by the district court and reach a different legal conclusion. AOB at 56-57. Appellants' argument—and the panel's novel standard seeming to adopt it—misconstrues the role of the district court vis-à-vis a jury.

court. To suggest otherwise (as the panel seemingly did here) would delegate to the jury the responsibility for drawing legal conclusions related to the *DialAmerica* factors. Indeed, even if there were disputed issues of fact, it is still proper for the court on a motion for summary judgment to conduct its holistic assessment. In doing so, the court would simply make its assessment as if those disputes were resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. If the outcome would be the same, then the dispute is not material and summary judgment is still appropriate.

The panel overlooked these two fundamental principles of Rule 56. First, it did not identify any evidence in the record that pointed to a genuine dispute as to any fact (that is, conflicting evidence that would require a trial to resolve). Second, it did not explain how the resolution of such purported disputes in Appellants' favor would have changed the outcome in light of the overwhelming undisputed evidence of an independent contractor relationship.

C. This Appeal Involves A Question Of Exceptional Importance.

This appeal involves a question of exceptional importance—the extent to which district courts can fulfill their duty under *DialAmerica* and *Verma* to evaluate economic relationships as a matter of law. The panel's decision will leave district courts adrift in future cases where they must evaluate increasingly novel economic relationships. At its core, the panel created a dueling (and results-driven) double standard for summary judgment in FLSA independent contractor cases—a

more lenient “*Verma* standard” to be applied when the worker appears to be an employee as a matter of law, and a separate and far more rigorous “*Razak* standard” to be applied when the worker appears to be an independent contractor as a matter of law. This Court should not countenance such a dichotomy.

The panel’s decision to evade the question of law before it in this case will surely have a chilling effect in future cases involving increasingly novel economic relationships. By focusing on isolated issues (none of which are genuinely disputed and none of which would have changed the outcome even if they were) and holding that “any issues of fact” preclude summary judgment, the panel’s decision ensures that district courts will become increasingly reluctant to do the job entrusted to them in *DialAmerica* and *Verma*.

This Court should revisit the panel’s decision and make clear that district courts must faithfully apply Rule 56 to FLSA cases challenging the independent contractor status of workers, just as they must apply it in every other civil action where there are no genuine disputes of material fact.

IV. CONCLUSION

The panel misstates the record and its opinion conflicts with existing precedent with regard to the appropriate summary judgment standard to apply to the FLSA’s multi-factor economic realities test. Appellees respectfully request a

panel rehearing or a rehearing en banc to correct these errors. This Court should vacate the panel's decision and affirm the judgment of the district court.

Dated: March 17, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robert W. Pritchard

Robert W. Pritchard (PA 76979)
Joshua C. Vaughn (PA 203040)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
625 Liberty Avenue, 26th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Telephone: (412) 201-7628
Email: rpritchard@littler.com
Email: jvaughn@littler.com

Paul C. Lantis (PA 309240)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: (267) 402-3073
Email: plantis@littler.com

Andrew M. Spurchise
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
900 Third Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 583-2684
Email: aspurchise@littler.com

Sophia Behnia
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 276-2561
Email: sbehnia@littler.com

*Attorneys for Appellees Uber
Technologies, Inc. and Gegen LLC*

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Dated: March 17, 2020

/s/ Robert W. Pritchard

Robert W. Pritchard (PA 76979)
Joshua C. Vaughn (PA 203040)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
625 Liberty Avenue, 26th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Telephone: (412) 201-7628
Facsimile: (412) 774-1957
Email: rpritchard@littler.com

Email: jvaughn@littler.com

Paul C. Lantis (PA 309240)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: (267) 402-3073
Email: plantis@littler.com

Andrew M. Spurchase
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
900 Third Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 583-2684
Email: aspurchase@littler.com

Sophia Behnia
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 276-2561
Email: sbehnia@littler.com

*Attorneys for Appellees Uber
Technologies, Inc. and Gegen LLC*

Exhibit 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 18-1944

ALI RAZAK; KENAN SABANI; KHALDOUN CHERDOUD, INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Appellants

v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GEGEN, LLC

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-16-cv-00573)
District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson

Argued January 15, 2019

Before: SMITH, *Chief Judge*, GREENAWAY, JR., and PORTER, *Circuit Judges*.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be considered on the record from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was argued on January 15, 2019.

On consideration whereof, it is now hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the District Court entered April 11, 2018, be and the same, is hereby VACATED and REMANDED. Costs shall not be taxed in this matter. All of the above in accordance with the Opinion of this Court.

ATTEST:

s/ Patricia S. Dodszeit

Clerk

Dated: March 3, 2020

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

PATRICIA S. DODSZUWEIT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TELEPHONE

CLERK

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
21400 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
601 MARKET STREET

215-597-2995

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19106-1790

Website: www.ca3.uscourts.gov



March 3, 2020

Jeremy E. Abay
Sacks Weston Diamond
1845 Walnut Street
Suite 1600
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Sophia Behnia
Littler Mendelson
333 Bush Street
34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104

Sharon M. Dietrich
Community Legal Services
1424 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Gabriel K. Gillett
Jenner & Block
353 North Clark Street
Suite 4500
Chicago, IL 60654

Ashley Keller
Keller Lenkner
150 North Riverside Plaza
Suite 4270
Chicago, IL 60606

Paul C. Lantis
Littler Mendelson
1601 Cherry Street
Three Parkway, Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Seth A. Meyer
Keller Lenkner
150 North Riverside Plaza
Suite 4270
Chicago, IL 60606

Robert W. Pritchard
Littler Mendelson
625 Liberty Avenue
EQT Plaza, 26th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Andrew M. Spurchise
Littler Mendelson
900 Third Avenue
8th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Adam G. Unikowsky
Jenner & Block
1099 New York Avenue
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001

Joshua Vaughn
Littler Mendelson
625 Liberty Avenue
EQT Plaza, 26th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

John K. Weston
Sacks Weston Diamond
1845 Walnut Street
Suite 1600
Philadelphia, PA 19103

RE: Ali Razak, et al v. Uber Technologies Inc, et al
Case Number: 18-1944
District Court Case Number: 2-16-cv-00573

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Today, **March 03, 2020** the Court entered its judgment in the above-captioned matter pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 36.

If you wish to seek review of the Court's decision, you may file a petition for rehearing. The procedures for filing a petition for rehearing are set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 35 and 40, 3rd Cir. LAR 35 and 40, and summarized below.

Time for Filing:

14 days after entry of judgment.

45 days after entry of judgment in a civil case if the United States is a party.

Form Limits:

3900 words if produced by a computer, with a certificate of compliance pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(g).

15 pages if hand or type written.

Attachments:

A copy of the panel's opinion and judgment only.

Certificate of service.

Certificate of compliance if petition is produced by a computer.

No other attachments are permitted without first obtaining leave from the Court.

Unless the petition specifies that the petition seeks only panel rehearing, the petition will be construed as requesting both panel and en banc rehearing. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(3), if separate petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc are submitted, they will be treated as a single document and will be subject to the form limits as set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(2). If only panel rehearing is sought, the Court's rules do not provide for the subsequent filing of a petition for rehearing en banc in the event that the petition seeking only panel rehearing is denied.

A party who is entitled to costs pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39 must file an itemized and verified bill of costs within 14 days from the entry of judgment. The bill of costs must be submitted on the proper form which is available on the court's website.

A mandate will be issued at the appropriate time in accordance with the Fed. R. App. P. 41.

Please consult the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the timing and requirements for filing a petition for writ of certiorari.

Very truly yours,
Patricia S. Dodszuweit, Clerk

By: *Timothy McIntyre*
Timothy McIntyre, Case Manager
267-299-4953

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 18-1944

ALI RAZAK; KENAN SABANI; KHALDOUN
CHERDOUD, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Appellants

v.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GEGEN, LLC

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-16-cv-00573)
District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson

Argued January 15, 2019

Before: SMITH, *Chief Judge*, GREENAWAY, JR., and
PORTER, *Circuit Judges*.

(Opinion Filed: March 3, 2020)

Jeremy E. Abay
John K. Weston
Sacks Weston Diamond
1845 Walnut Street
Suite 1600
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Ashley Keller [ARGUED]
Seth A. Meyer
Keller Lenkner
150 North Riverside Plaza
Suite 2570
Chicago, IL 60654
Counsel for Appellants

Sharon M. Dietrich
Community Legal Services
1424 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Amicus Appellants

Sophia Behnia
Littler Mendelson
333 Bush Street
34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104

Wendy S. Buckingham
Paul C. Lantis
Littler Mendelson
1601 Cherry Street
Suite 1400, Three Parkway

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Robert W. Pritchard **[ARGUED]**
Joshua Vaughn
Littler Mendelson
625 Liberty Avenue
EQT Plaza, 26th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Andrew M. Spurchise
Littler Mendelson
900 Third Avenue
8th Floor
New York, NY 10022
Counsel for Appellees

Gabriel K. Gillett
Jenner & Block
353 North Clark Street
Suite 4500
Chicago, IL 60654

Adam G. Unikowsky
Jenner & Block
1099 New York Avenue
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Amicus Appellees

OPINION

GREENAWAY, JR., *Circuit Judge*.

This case is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment on the question of whether drivers for UberBLACK are employees or independent contractors within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, and similar Pennsylvania state laws. For the following reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. Facts¹

Plaintiffs Ali Razak, Kenan Sabani, and Khaldoun Cherdoud² (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are Pennsylvania drivers who utilize Defendant Uber Technologies’ ride-sharing mobile phone application (“Driver App”). Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of a putative class of all persons who provide limousine

¹ The facts recited in this section are undisputed except as otherwise noted.

² Plaintiffs argue that each Plaintiff should be viewed as an individual for FLSA analysis purposes. However, the FLSA analysis would remain the same regardless of whether Plaintiffs are treated collectively or individually. *See United States v. Cook*, 795 F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Additionally, Plaintiffs do not present significantly distinguishable facts, as all are self-incorporated drivers and have made similar choices regarding business opportunities within the UberBLACK platform.

services, now known as UberBLACK, through Defendant's Driver App in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.³ Plaintiffs bring individual and representative claims against Uber Technologies, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Gegen, LLC, ("Gegen," and collectively, "Uber") for violations of the federal minimum wage and overtime requirements under the FLSA, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA"), and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law ("WPCL").

Plaintiffs Razak, Sabani, and Cherdoud each own and operate independent transportation companies ("ITCs")⁴ Luxe Limousine Services, Inc. ("Luxe"), Freemo Limo, LLC ("Freemo"), and Milano Limo, Inc. ("Milano"), respectively. In order for drivers to contract to drive for UberBLACK, they must form ITCs. Each ITC, in turn, enters into a Technology Services Agreement with Uber. The Technology Services Agreement includes a Software License and Online Services Agreement that allows UberBLACK drivers to utilize the

³ This case only pertains to UberBLACK drivers, and not drivers for other Uber platforms, such as UberX or UberPool. All references to "Uber drivers" only pertain to "UberBLACK drivers" in Philadelphia.

⁴ ITCs are independent companies "in the business of providing transportation services." App. 385. Some ITCs are self-incorporated solo drivers, while others, like Plaintiffs' ITCs, are larger companies that work with additional drivers who utilize the Uber Driver App. Uber directly contracts with an ITC via their Technology Services Agreement.

technology service Uber provides to generate leads, as well as outlines the relationship between ITCs and Uber riders, ITCs and Uber, and ITCs and their drivers. Additionally, it describes driver requirements, vehicle requirements, financial terms, and contains an arbitration clause for dispute resolution between ITCs and Uber.

Uber also requires that drivers sign a Driver Addendum,⁵ which is a legal agreement between the ITC and the for-hire driver, before a driver can utilize the Driver App. The Driver Addendum allows a driver to receive “lead generation and related services” through Uber’s Driver App. App. 409. The Addendum also outlines driver requirements (such as maintaining a valid driver’s license), insurance requirements, dispute resolution, and the “Driver’s Relationship with Uber,” in which Uber uses clear language to attempt to establish the parameters of the Driver’s working relationship with Uber.⁶ App. 411.

⁵ The Driver Addendum states, “[i]n order to use the Uber Services, Driver and Transportation Company must agree to the terms and conditions that are set forth below. Upon Driver’s execution (electronic or otherwise) of this Addendum, Driver and Transportation Company shall be bound by the terms and conditions set forth herein.” App. 409.

⁶ Boilerplate language in the Driver Addendum to the Technology Services Agreement sets forth, among other things, that ITCs “acknowledge[] and agree[] that Uber is a technology services provider” that “does not provide transportation services, function as a transportation carrier, nor

For UberBLACK, Uber holds a certificate of public convenience from, and is licensed by, the Philadelphia Parking Authority (“PPA”) to operate a limousine company. Transportation companies and individual transportation providers who provide Black car services in Philadelphia are required to hold a PPA certificate of public convenience or associate with an entity that holds such a certificate. Some UberBLACK transportation providers operate under the PPA certificate held by Uber. Luxe, an ITC owned by Razak, operates under its own PPA certificate. Additionally, approximately 75% of UberBLACK drivers use Uber’s automobile insurance.

Plaintiffs claim that they are employees, and sue Uber for violations of minimum wage and overtime requirements under federal and state laws. Under the FLSA, employers must pay employees the applicable minimum wage for each hour worked, and, if an employee works more than forty hours in a given week, the employer must pay one and a half (1 ½) times

operate[s] as a broker for transportation of passengers” App. 13. “ITCs shall provide all necessary equipment; Uber does not direct or control ITCs or their drivers generally or in their performance.” *Id.* “ITCs and their drivers retain the sole right to determine when, where, and for how long each of them will utilize the Driver App or the Uber Service, and ITCs agree to pay Uber a service fee on a per transportation services transaction basis.” *Id.* ITCs must also “maintain during the term of this Agreement workers’ compensation insurance for itself and any of its subcontractors” *Id.* The Driver Addendum also sets forth and requires that the relationship between the ITCs and their drivers is “contractual or [an] employment arrangement.” *Id.*

the regular rate for each hour subsequently worked. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207. Plaintiffs contend that time spent online on the Uber Driver App qualifies as compensable time under the FLSA. Principal among Plaintiffs’ arguments is that Uber controls the access and use of the Driver App.

To access Uber services, drivers open the Driver App on a mobile device, log in, and tap a button to be online. Once online, a driver can choose to accept a trip, but if the driver does not accept the trip within fifteen seconds of the trip request, it is deemed rejected by the driver. The Driver App will automatically route the trip request to the next closest driver, and if no other driver accepts the trip, the trip request goes unfulfilled, as Uber cannot require any driver to accept a trip. UberBLACK drivers are free to reject trips for any reason, aside from unlawful discrimination. However, if a driver ignores three trip requests in a row, the Uber Driver App will automatically move the driver from online to offline, such that he cannot accept additional trip requests.

Uber sets the financial terms of all UberBLACK fares, and riders pay by having their credit cards linked to the App. After a ride is completed, Uber charges the rider’s credit card for the fare. Uber then deposits the money into the transportation company’s Uber account with a commission taken out by Uber. The transportation company then distributes the payment to the driver who provided the ride.

Uber also has regulations under which it logs off drivers for a period of six hours if the driver reaches Uber’s twelve-hour driving limit. Trip requests are generally sent to the driver closest in proximity to the requesting rider, and drivers have no way of knowing from the Uber Driver App what the demand for drivers is at any given time (and thus, how much their

earnings will be based on that demand). Drivers also do not know where a rider's final destination is prior to accepting the ride.

There is one exception affecting a driver's ability to accept trip requests from anywhere in Philadelphia. If a driver is at one of Philadelphia's major transportation hubs: 30th Street Train Station or Philadelphia International Airport, he must utilize a "queue" system that routes trips to the next driver in the queue, and the driver can only enter, or advance in, the queue while physically located inside a designated zone.

On appeal, Uber reasserts that Plaintiffs are not employees as a matter of law, and therefore, their putative class action should be subject to summary judgment. To support this contention, Uber portrays UberBLACK drivers as entrepreneurs who utilize Uber as a software platform to acquire trip requests. Uber asserts that Plaintiffs are not restricted from working for other companies, pay their own expenses, and on some occasions, engage workers for their own ITCs. They can use UberBLACK as little or as much as they want or choose not to work for UberBLACK and instead work for competitors such as Blacklane and Lyft.

Uber asserts that it places no restrictions on drivers' ability to engage in personal activities while online. Plaintiffs in this matter engaged in a range of personal activities, including accepting rides from private clients, accepting rides from other rideshare programs, sleeping, running personal errands, smoking cigarettes, taking personal phone calls, rejecting UberBLACK trips because they were tired, and conducting personal business.

Alternatively, Plaintiffs claim that they are “employees” under the FLSA because they are controlled by Uber when they are online and perform an integral role for Uber’s business. The District Court agreed with Uber’s position, and granted Uber’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the question of whether Plaintiffs qualify as “employees” of Uber under the FLSA and PMWA. Plaintiffs now appeal from the summary judgment order.

II. Procedural History

Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on January 6, 2016. Defendants successfully removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserting federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Uber moved to dismiss the case and compel arbitration. Alternatively, as a separate matter, Uber moved to stay this action. The District Court denied both motions, concluding that Plaintiffs had complied with the arbitration opt-out procedures allowed by the Technology Services Agreement. Uber then moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the District Court granted in part and denied in part. The District Court found that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to support that they were “employees” instead of “independent contractors,” such that judgment on the pleadings was not appropriate.

Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on October 13, 2016, and Uber moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint in its entirety, as well as moved to strike certain portions of the Amended Complaint in the alternative. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. The Court found that Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were logged into the Uber Driver App and eligible to receive trip requests from prospective UberBLACK

riders (“Online”) for more than 40 hours was sufficient to state a claim at the pleading stage under the FLSA. However, the District Court found that the question of whether Plaintiffs’ time spent online was actually compensable work time within the meaning of the FLSA was a dispositive issue, and designated the issue of compensability of Plaintiffs’ online time for expedited discovery.

After substantial discovery, Uber moved for partial summary judgment on the limited issue of whether, assuming that Plaintiffs qualify as “employees” and Uber as an “employer” under the FLSA for purposes of the motion only, the time they spent online on the Uber Driver App is compensable work time under the FLSA, and by extension, the PMWA. The Court ultimately denied the motion for partial summary judgment, determining that the compensability question at issue in the motion “may be inextricably intertwined with the threshold employee versus independent contractor question.” App. 8.

After discovery was fully complete, Uber filed its motion for summary judgment on the dispositive question of whether Plaintiffs are employees or independent contractors. The District Court granted Uber’s motion for summary judgment determining that Plaintiffs do not qualify as “employees” of Uber under the FLSA and PMWA. As a matter of law, the District Court found that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show that they are employees of Uber. Plaintiffs timely appealed from the summary judgment order.

III. Applicable Law: *Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc.*

The minimum wage and overtime wage provisions at issue all require that Plaintiffs prove that they are “employees.” 29

U.S.C. §§ 203, 206–207. Although Plaintiffs’ case includes claims under the PMWA, Pennsylvania state courts have looked to federal law regarding the FLSA for guidance in applying the PMWA. *See Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Stuber*, 822 A.2d 870, 873 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003), *aff’d*, 859 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 2004). The FLSA defines “employer” as “includ[ing] any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,” and “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (e)(1). Given the circularity of the definitions, federal courts, with guidance from the Department of Labor, have established standards to determine how to define employee and employer.

The Third Circuit utilizes the test outlined in *Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc.*, 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), to determine employee status under the FLSA. This seminal case acknowledges that when Congress promulgated the FLSA, it intended it to have the “broadest definition of ‘employee.’” *See id.* at 1382 (citing 81 Cong. Rec. 7657 (remarks of Senator Hugo L. Black)). In *DialAmerica*, we used six factors—and indeed adopted the Ninth Circuit’s test—to determine whether a worker is an employee under the FLSA:

- 1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which the work is to be performed;
- 2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
- 3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers;
- 4) whether the service rendered required a special skill;
- 5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; [and]
- 6) whether the

service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.

Id. (quoting *Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners*, 656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981)).

Our decision in *DialAmerica* is consistent with the Supreme Court's general guidance in *Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb*, 331 U.S. 722 (1947). In *Rutherford*, the Supreme Court first determined "employee" status under the FLSA. *Id.* at 728–30. And in *DialAmerica*, we agreed with *Sureway Cleaners* that "neither the presence nor absence of any particular factor is dispositive." 757 F.2d at 1382. Therefore, "courts should examine the circumstances of the whole activity," determining whether, "as a matter of economic reality, the individuals are dependent upon the business to which they render service." *Id.* (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The burden lies with Plaintiffs to prove that they are employees. *See, e.g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.*, 328 U.S. 680, 686–87 (1946) (a plaintiff who brings suit under the FLSA "has the burden of proving that he performed work for which he was not properly compensated") (internal citations omitted).

IV. The District Court Opinion

The District Court granted summary judgment to Uber ruling that drivers for UberBLACK are independent contractors within the meaning of the FLSA and similar Pennsylvania laws. The District Court, in applying the six factors, relied heavily on the analysis in *DialAmerica* and other cases that had examined the use of internet or app-based programs for acquiring work.

The District Court applied all six factors in *DialAmerica*, and on balance, found that Plaintiffs were independent contractors. There were four factors the Court applied that were interpreted in favor of independent contractor status. The District Court analyzed the employer's right to control the manner in which the work is to be performed and noted that the written agreements entered into by the Plaintiffs and their transportation companies, in addition to the ability of Plaintiffs to hire sub-contractors and work for competing companies, point to a lack of control by Uber. Next, the District Court analyzed the alleged employees' opportunity for profit or loss and found that this also supports independent contractor status. The District Court found that Plaintiffs can work as much or as little as they would like and choose not to accept trip requests where the opportunity for profit was greater to work for themselves or competitors. Because the "profit-loss" factor does not require that Plaintiffs be solely in control of their profits or losses, Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in convincing the District Court that they were employees despite the fact that Uber retains the right to determine how much to charge passengers and which driver receives which trip request. UberBLACK drivers must purchase or lease their own expensive vehicle to drive for UberBLACK, demonstrating independent status as well. And the "relationship permanence" can be as long or non-existent as the driver desires, again illustrating the impermanent working relationships often found with independent contractors.

The District Court determined that only two factors militated in Plaintiffs' favor. As limousine drivers, the service they render does not really require a special skill. Second, the limousine driving service rendered to Uber by UberBLACK drivers is an essential part of Uber's business as a

transportation company. The District Court held that the movant demonstrated that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that a majority of the *DialAmerica* factors leaned against employment status. The District Court granted Uber's motion for summary judgment and determined that Plaintiffs were independent contractors.

V. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The District Court had and executed supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the District Court's order granting summary judgment is a final order.

This Court exercises plenary review over a District Court's grant of summary judgment. *Aruajo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc.*, 708 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2013). This Court can affirm a grant of summary judgment only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." *Id.* The Court must view the facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Id.* at 255. In attempting to defeat summary judgment, "[s]peculation and conclusory allegations do not satisfy [the nonmoving party's] duty." *Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E.*, 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999).

VI. Analysis

A. *Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Exist*

For summary judgment to have been appropriate, there must have been no genuine disputes as to any material facts on the record, entitling Uber to judgment as a matter of law. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As such, if there is a genuine dispute of material fact, the question of which *DialAmerica* factors favor employee status is a question of fact that should go to a fact-finder. Here, the ultimate question of law is whether Plaintiffs are employees or independent contractors, which is for a judge to decide. But, if a court finds that there are any issues of fact that remain in dispute, it must resolve those disputes prior to granting summary judgment. *See DialAmerica*, 757 F.2d at 1381. In *DialAmerica*, the parties stipulated to some facts and reserved the right to present testimony on any remaining disputed issues. Then, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the remaining disputed issues of fact:

- (1) the extent to which home researchers and distributors were dependent on DialAmerica;
- (2) the extent to which they had an opportunity for profit or loss;
- (3) the extent to which they exercised initiative, business judgment, or foresight in their activities;
- (4) the extent of any financial investment in conjunction with their work for DialAmerica; and
- (5) the extent to which the services provided by the home researchers and distributors were an integral part of DialAmerica's business.

Id.

These factual issues refer directly to the factors which determine whether someone is an employee or independent contractor. The district court resolved these disputes and granted DialAmerica's motion for summary judgment. We reviewed the district court's decision in *DialAmerica* and determined that summary judgment was a mischaracterization, but the proper outcome, as all the factual disputes were resolved prior to adjudication on the merits.⁷ *Id.* at 1381, 1388.

DialAmerica teaches that where there are questions of fact that need resolution, these questions must go to a fact-finder.⁸ This

⁷ In *DialAmerica*, Judge Becker noted that, because the district court held a two-day hearing to find relevant facts, this Court would “simply treat the [district] court’s letter opinions as the findings of facts and conclusions of law required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, and its orders as judgments entered after trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.” 757 F.2d at 1381–82. Here, that avenue is not available to us, as no evidentiary hearing was held to find relevant facts to determine if summary judgment was appropriate.

⁸ An important distinction exists between a factual dispute, and a factual dispute that is material. Summary judgment is correctly granted in many situations where the parties genuinely dispute facts but where the dispute is not material to the adjudication of the case. *See, e.g., Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc.*, 937 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 2019) (granting summary judgment on the question of employee versus independent contractor status, but noting that “[i]n some cases, one or more

case presents such genuine disputes of material facts. Uber submitted a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts to which Plaintiffs responded with almost a hundred pages of disputes. For example, disputed facts include whether Plaintiffs are operating within Uber's system and under Uber's rules, and whether Plaintiffs or their corporations contracted directly with Uber. Although the District Court states that its decision derived from undisputed facts, the disputes presented by the parties go to the core of the *DialAmerica* factors and present a genuine dispute of material facts. Accordingly, we will remand to the District Court as summary judgment was inappropriate.

B. The "Right to Control" Factor

To illustrate that there are genuine disputes remaining, we look to the first *DialAmerica* factor: "the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the manner in which the work is to be performed." *DialAmerica*, 757 F.2d at 1382 (citation omitted). While not dispositive, this factor is highly relevant to the FLSA analysis. The District Court in this case held that the first factor supported a finding of independent contractor status. Actual control of the manner of work is not essential;

genuine issues of fact concerning the relevant economic relations may preclude a trial court from drawing a conclusion as a matter of law on the . . . issue[,]” and addressing that it would be appropriate for those cases to go to trial so that the genuine disputes of material fact be resolved by the jury). Here, genuine disputes of material fact exist because certain facts bear on how the *DialAmerica* factors will be resolved.

rather, it is the right to control which is determinative. *Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs.*, 582 F.2d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1978).

The parties contest whether Uber exercises control over drivers. While Uber categorizes drivers as using the Uber App to “connect with riders using the UberBLACK product,” App. 486, which may imply that drivers independently contract with riders through the platform, Plaintiffs contend that this is not so. Uber also contends that drivers can drive for other services while driving for Uber, however Plaintiffs contend that while “online” for Uber, they cannot also accept rides through other platforms. Plaintiffs reference Uber’s Driver Deactivation Policy that establishes that “soliciting payment of fares outside the Uber system leads to deactivation” and “activities conducted outside of Uber’s system—like anonymous pickups—are prohibited.” App. 487.

Uber also asserts that it does not control the “schedule start or stop times” for drivers or “require them to work for a set number of hours.” App. 536. Again, Plaintiffs dispute this, stating that the Uber Owner/Operator Agreement states, “[the] frequency with which [Uber] offers Requests to [the driver] under this Agreement shall be in the sole discretion of the Company” and “the number of trip requests available to Plaintiffs is largely driven by Uber.” *Id.*

The above factual disputes all go to whether Uber retains the right to control the Plaintiffs’ work. The District Court in its analysis acknowledged what the Plaintiffs asserted, but assigned little value to their assertions in light of Uber’s contractual agreement with Plaintiffs, Uber’s assertion that Plaintiffs are permitted to hire sub-contractors, and that “plaintiffs and their helpers are permitted to work for competing companies.” App. 31. However, whether Plaintiffs

are considered to “work” for a competing company while being “online” on the Uber Driver App is also a disputed factual issue. This illustrates why summary judgment was inappropriate at this stage.

Further, these and other disputed facts regarding control demonstrate why this case was not ripe for summary judgment. For example, Plaintiffs assert that “Uber does punish drivers for cancelling trips,” App. 539, and “Uber coerces UberBLACK drivers to go online and accept trips by making automatic weekly deductions against their account.” App. 538. Plaintiffs additionally assert that they derived all of their income for their respective businesses from Uber in certain years, which Uber disputes.

Although both parties argue that there are no genuine disputes regarding control, the facts adduced show otherwise. While Uber determines what drivers are paid and directs drivers where to drop off passengers, it lacks the right to control when drivers must drive. UberBLACK drivers exercise a high level of control, as they can drive as little or as much as they desire, without losing their ability to drive for UberBLACK. However, Uber deactivates drivers who fall short of the 4.7-star UberBLACK driver rating and limits the number of consecutive hours that a driver may work.

C. Opportunity for Profit or Loss Depending on Managerial Skill

As with the right to control, the District Court held that there was no genuine dispute as to another factor—the opportunity for profit or loss depending on managerial skill. Again, we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion. The District Court, in this case, ruled that this factor strongly favored

independent contractor status because drivers could be strategic in determining when, where, and how to utilize the Driver App to obtain more lucrative trip requests and to generate more profits. Plaintiffs could also work for competitors and transport private clients.⁹

However, other material facts reveal that there was and still is a genuine dispute. For example, Uber decides (1) the fare; (2) which driver receives a trip request; (3) whether to refund or

⁹ Indeed, the District Court stressed Plaintiffs' ability "to make money elsewhere[.]" App. 35. Yet, based on our precedent, it is unclear whether this factor looks only toward opportunity for profit or loss *within* the alleged employment relationship or whether it also contemplates one's ability to make money elsewhere—as such, external factors, such as the ability to earn outside revenue without terminating the Uber-driver relationship, may be irrelevant to the analysis. *See Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc.*, 949 F.2d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that "station operators had no meaningful opportunities for profit nor . . . loss, because the volume of business depended upon the location of each station rather than upon the managerial skills of the operators" but not discussing whether station operators had other jobs elsewhere); *see also Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd.*, 854 F.3d 131, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2017) (considering a worker's ability to earn income from competitors and other sources, but emphasizing that "it is not what Plaintiffs *could* have done that counts, but as a matter of economic reality what they actually *do* that is dispositive." (internal citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted)). As this argument was not able to be developed by the parties, this, along with other material factual disputes, is ripe to be developed at trial.

cancel a passenger's fare; and (4) a driver's territory, which is subject to change without notice. Moreover, Plaintiffs can drive for competitors, but Uber may attempt to frustrate those who try, and most of the factors that determine an UberBLACK driver's Uber-profit, like advertising and price setting, are also controlled by Uber.¹⁰ Under the circumstances, we believe that a reasonable fact-finder could rule in favor of Plaintiffs.¹¹ Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate.

¹⁰ The District Court also considered "Plaintiffs investments in their own companies" as "relevant to the 'profit and loss' factor," as weighing "heavily in favor of 'independent contractor' status." App. 36. But, as stated earlier, parties frame this issue differently and assert different facts—again showing that summary judgment was inappropriate. For example, Uber asserts that Plaintiff Razak's ITC Luxe Limousine Services, Inc. invested in up to sixteen vehicles and had as many as fourteen to seventeen drivers. And while Plaintiffs do not deny that they invested in their personal vehicles, which they use to provide UberBLACK rides, as discussed already, there is an inherent dispute regarding whether drivers are allowed to exercise judgment and select the farthest rides for the largest payment, as Uber determines which driver is given which rider.

¹¹ We also note that the District Court did not interpret whether Plaintiffs could in actuality exercise any managerial skill while being "online" to increase their profits, only that they could

D. Remaining DialAmerica Factor Analysis

Of the remaining factors, some do not require further factfinding, while others still do. The fifth factor, degree of permanence of the working relationship, has genuine disputes of material fact. On one hand, Uber can take drivers offline, and on the other hand, Plaintiffs can drive whenever they choose to turn on the Driver App, with no minimum amount of driving time required.

Alternatively, the fourth factor, whether the service rendered requires a special skill, is clearer. It is generally accepted that “driving” is not itself a “special skill.” *Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.*, 765 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2014). Although there may be a distinction between “driving” and “replicat[ing] the limousine experience,” as noted by the District Court, it is not enough to overcome the presumption that driving is not a special skill. App. 38. This fourth factor certainly weighs in favor of finding that Plaintiffs are employees.¹²

potentially choose to perform other jobs to make a greater profit.

¹² Lastly, the District Court found that the work UberBLACK drivers provide is integral to the service Uber renders under the sixth *DialAmerica* factor. Simply put by the District Court, “it seems beyond dispute that if Uber could not find drivers, Uber would not be able to function.” App. 40. We acknowledge that Uber strenuously disputes this finding, insisting instead that it is a technology company that supports drivers’ transportation businesses, and not a transportation company

VII. Conclusion

In reviewing the District Court decision *de novo*, we determine summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine disputes of material facts remained. We do not opine on whether the disputed facts should be resolved by a jury or the District Court through a Rule 52 proceeding, as was the case in *DialAmerica*. However, these material factual disputes must be resolved. For the foregoing reasons, we will remand the matter for further proceedings.

that employs drivers. We also believe this could be a disputed material fact that should be resolved by a fact-finder.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that, on March 17, 2020, I filed the foregoing Petition of Appellees For Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc with the Court's ECF system, such that Appellants' counsel, identified below, should receive service automatically via electronic mail through that ECF system.

John K. Weston, Esquire
Jeremy E. Abay, Esquire
Sacks Weston Diamond, LLC
1845 Walnut Street, Suite 1600
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Ashley Keller, Esquire
Seth Meyer, Esquire
Keller Lenkner LLC
150 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2570
Chicago, IL 60610

Dated: March 17, 2020

/s/ Robert W. Pritchard

Robert W. Pritchard (PA 76979)
Joshua C. Vaughn (PA 203040)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
625 Liberty Avenue, 26th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Telephone: (412) 201-7628
Email: rpritchard@littler.com
Email: jvaughn@littler.com

Paul C. Lantis (PA 309240)
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Telephone: (267) 402-3073
Email: plantis@littler.com

Andrew M. Spurchise
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
900 Third Avenue, 8th Floor

New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 583-2684
Email: aspurchase@littler.com

Sophia Behnia
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 276-2561
Email: sbehnia@littler.com

*Attorneys for Appellees Uber
Technologies, Inc. and Gegen LLC*